Abstract: Three German economists analyze the determinants of access to health care in rural Russia and ask whether income and ability-to-pay, emerging as the major determinants of access in urban areas, have begun to govern rural populations' access to health-care services. Using household data from a survey conducted in the year 2000 (N=321 households) in two regions of Russia-Oryol and Leningrad Oblasts-the authors examine how the reduced role of the state and the concomitant decentralization of policy-making have affected access of the rural populace to health services. Broader policy implications and suggestions for ensuring future access to services in rural areas are offered. .
INTRODUCTION
t the start of the 1990s, hopes were high in the Russian Federation that democracy and a market economy would bring about rapid improvements in living conditions. The decade showed, however, that the shift from a planned to a market economy would take much longer than originally anticipated. In rural areas of the Russian Federation, the reduction in social services has been particularly severe for several reasons. In comparison to the rest of the economy, the economic downturn of agriculture has been especially steep and has been accompanied by the collapse of the former collective farms. At the end of the 1990s about 80 percent of these large-scale agricultural enterprises were unprofitable (Serova, 2000) . Prior to the collapse of the socialist system these farms effectively constituted focal points for the rural communities and were heavily involved in the provision of various social services. Health services, as well as a range of other social services (such as maintenance of public infrastructure), were offered as public goods by these farms, or at least the provision of these services depended on the farms (Pallot, 1990) . Since 1991 such social services have been transferred to municipalities, which often lack the funds necessary to maintain them. Consequently, rural services have often been degraded and under-maintained (Healey et al., 1999) . Furthermore, the massive scale of inter-regional redistribution policies in the former Soviet Union (FSU) obscured structural weaknesses. For example, large segments of the population were obliged to live in rural regions with few resources, such as agriculturally marginal areas that would not have offered a sufficient economic basis for income under market conditions. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the widespread collapse of the social security system hit such population groups all the more severely.
While it is clear that the provision of social services in rural areas has changed significantly in the course of transition, it is unclear how the quality and quantity of social services, as well as the institutional and organizational arrangements through which these goods are provided, have changed (OECD, 2001) . The purpose of this article is to analyze changes in the provision of social services in rural Russia, using health care as an example. The article focuses on (1) general changes in health-care provision in Russia and currently existing institutional arrangements for provision of health-care services; (2) empirical analysis of factors that determine access to health care by individual rural households; (3) analysis of the results from a household survey and qualitative focus-group interviews; (4) policy conclusions for improving the access to health-care services and facilities in rural Russia.
HEALTH CARE IN TRANSITION: THE RURAL RUSSIAN SETTING
The central health achievement of the Soviet Union was the provision of universal coverage and equitable access to health care on the basis of citizenship. Officially the population was guaranteed comprehensive coverage, free at the point of use, and patients were asked only to pay out of pocket for out-patient prescriptions, prostheses, and dental care (WHO, 1998) . In rural areas the first point of contact in the health system was the health post, staffed by a feldsher-midwife. Any problems requiring more complex treatment would be referred to the next level in the system: a rural health center, a polyclinic, or the central district hospital. The health post itself frequently was provided by a rural enterprise, such as a kolkhoz or sovkhoz, rather than by the local government. Even where rural enterprises were not the owners of health-care facilities, they frequently acted as patrons, contributing resources toward the maintenance of the facility.
With the transition from a planned to a market economy came changes to the health-care system. During the early 1990s the highly centralized Soviet health-care system gave way to a more decentralized model with a reduced role for the state. The provision of public services in Russia is intimately linked to the health of the fiscal system. Throughout most of the 1990s Russia's public finances were in varying degrees of crisis. In 1994, the public budget deficit reached 10.4 percent of GDP and constituted a serious barrier for economy-wide and sectoral economic recovery (Wehrheim and Wiebelt, 1999) . Nevertheless, Russian reformers wanted to preserve universal access to free health care and even to increase financing of the health sector. At the same time, they wished to augment the role of market forces. Hence, a system of universal compulsory medical insurance was signed into law in 1993 (Twigg, 1998) with the intention that it should contribute 30 percent of the total health care budget (Sheiman, 1997) . While the payroll tax did cover 35 percent of the health budget by 1997, financing of health care in real terms declined by more than 30 percent between 1991 and 1998 (OECD, 2001; see Table 1 ).
Under the new system, regions and districts (oblasts and rayons) own and monitor health-care institutions, while regional health-insurance funds deal with cash flows and insurance companies.
2 Regions are obliged to finance 60 percent of the health-care system and have total control over the regional compulsory health insurance funds (WHO, 1998) . However, decentralization of the health-care system did not stop with the regions. The autonomy of districts has increased substantially over the last ten years as well. They have taken on the executive role at the local level, and health care has become the de facto responsibility of the districts. Significant variations in the interpretation of the role of districts in the health-care system, as well as the differences in income between regions, have increased regional disparities in health-care provision.
The statutory health-care system guarantees access to a comprehensive range of services to the entire population at no charge. The working population is covered by insurance payments made by their employers, while the unemployed, children, students, pensioners, and the disabled are covered by contributions made on their behalf by district authorities. Voluntary health insurance is available for those who wish to secure additional services, but it is not yet widespread. In 2000 only 1.9 percent of respondents in the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey held supple-mentary health insurance (Zohoori et al., 2001) . The decline in public funding has been severe, considerably reducing the ability of the health system to provide high-quality care to all patients. To help meet the shortfall in public funding, the practice of informal patient payments and formal patient charges has expanded (OECD, 2001) . A survey by Boston University found that, although public expenditures on health care had declined in Russia, a substantial increase in private expenditure on health care had led total health-care spending at the end of the 1990s to be on par with the average calculated for the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2001 ). According to the OECD, in December 1998 the average ratio of private to public financing of health care in Russia was much higher than the OECD average (OECD, 2001) . The study indicates that the practice of informal and formal patient charges has served as a means for patients in urban Russia to gain access to medical care. People who were able to pay received care, while those who could not afford to pay had to wait or did not receive care (OECD, 2001) .
Such a development has important implications for access to health care and equality of access. If informal payments (user charges) are also widespread in rural areas and similarly act as a vehicle by which patients gain access to services, then access to health care in rural Russia could become contingent on ability-to-pay just as it has for Russia's urban population. Few studies within economics have explored what determines household demand for health care in rural areas of transition economies. The increase in formal and informal payments discussed above suggests that ability-to-pay is becoming increasingly important in gaining access to , 1991-1998 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Public expenditure (percent of GDP) 2.9 2.5 3.7 3.9 2.9 3.1 3. health care. On the basis of this literature review, we postulate the following hypotheses, which we will test empirically in this article:
Income is an important determinant of access to healthcare services.
Hypothesis 2. "Out-of-pocket" payments are a second important determinant of access to health-care services.
Hypothesis 3. There are differences in access to health-care services between districts.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE IN RURAL RUSSIA: THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
To empirically assess the determinants of demand for health-care services, a two-part model is used (Manning et al., 1987) . 3 The first part analyzes the determinants of access to health-care services, while the second analyzes determinants of health-care expenditure for those who reported use. Access to health care is defined as: (a) the likelihood of visiting a health-care provider, and (b) the financial burden-more specifically, the out-of-pocket payments-borne by individuals in order to make use of services. A two-model approach is chosen because using expenditures alone does not capture the potential use of those who did not seek care. The distribution of health-care expenditures typically is not a normal one, because there are many non-spenders who did not use health care in the recall period. The distribution is also skewed because a number of users did not incur any expenditure upon use. Since, in Russia, visits to healthcare providers ostensibly are free of charge, a proportion of health-care users may not incur any out-of-pocket expenditure upon using a healthcare provider. This problem is solved in the analysis through the use of a tobit model, while the problem of non-users is addressed by restricting the analysis of health-care expenditures to those who reported use.
Part one of the model is a binary logit model. It estimates the probability of an individual's visiting a health-care provider during the recall period. Formally it can be written as follows:
Part two is a tobit model that estimates the incurred level of out-of-pocket expenditures conditioned on positive use of health-care service. Formally it can be written as:
X is a set of individual and household characteristics that are hypothesized to affect individual patterns of utilization and expenditure, β and γ are vectors of coefficients, e and µ are error terms.
METHOD OF INVESTIGATION
The study uses data collected in a survey that was carried out in October 2000 in two regions of European Russia-Oryol and Leningrad Oblasts. 4 Rural households located in eight districts were surveyed as to their expenditure on health and education, income, economic activity, and general living conditions. The health-related variables were based on a three-month recall period and include case of illness, choice of health-care provider, and amounts paid for consultation and pharmaceuticals. Moreover, the survey recorded the overall sum spent on health care during one month, irrespective of whether a household member had been ill. To complement the household data, the survey included a community component, which provides information on the availability of health facilities in the community. The sample contains 321 households.
A two-stage sampling procedure was used to select households: in the first stage, four communities were picked in each of the districts in which the survey was carried out. In the second stage, households were selected using constant sampling fraction to ensure that within each district each household had the same probability of being selected. Households were selected using linear systematic sampling with community registers providing the sampling frame. Table 2 provides an overview of the variables and their means used in models 1 and 2. The main variables of interest in this analysis are household income and district variables such as district expenditure on health care per capita (MEDPC) or population density (POPDENS). Interest in the latter variables stems from the decentralization of health care to the district level. Because overall responsibility for health care is split between municipalities and the regional health-insurance funds, we expect inter-district differences in access to health care and in the quality of service provided. It is anticipated that, ceteris paribus, the likelihood of visiting a health-care provider is higher and the level of out-of-pocket expenditures lower in districts that spend more on health care per capita (MEDPC). Population density (POPDENS) affects the provision of health-care services positively because it reduced the unit cost of provision.
The age and education level (EDYEARS) of the household head refer to the household head responsible for the household budget and use of public services (generally a woman). The number of children (CHILDREN) in the household is included to control for the fact that children are more susceptible to illness and hence more likely to visit a health-care provider in the recall period. Similarly, household size (SIZE) could have a positive effect, as the larger the household the greater the likelihood that someone may fall ill during the recall period. However, the high proportion of singleperson households means that household size could be negatively correlated with probability of visit, as members of single-person households have no one to care for them at home. Car ownership (CAR) increases mobility of household heads and decreases the effect of distance and is thus included in the model. To control for self-selection bias, a health-status proxy-household expenditure on medication (HSTATUS)-is included. 5 It is assumed that a member of a household with poor health status is more likely to visit a health-care provider than a member of a healthier household. Finally, a number of community characteristics to control for specific local settings (community size [POP] , distance to hospital [KMHOSP] ) are included. The latter variable is included because distance to the nearest hospital is anticipated to have a negative impact on access.
In order to control for the fact that some users are entitled to exemptions from pharmaceutical charges, the dummy variable EXEMPT is included in the second step. This variable indicates that some patients, such as veterans of the army, received even pharmaceuticals free of charge. As cost of pharmaceuticals is a major component of health expenditure, EXEMPT is expected to have a negative effect on expenditures. The level of expenditures incurred on visiting a health-care provider is also likely to vary with the type of provider. In the survey, seven types of health-care provider were included: health post (FAP), rural hospital (RUHOSP), polyclinic (CLINIC), district hospital (CRH), enterprise clinic (ENT), private clinic (PRIV), and specialist clinic (SPECIAL).
The Leningrad and Oryol samples were combined for the model estimations. High correlation between the variable MEDPC and the regional dummy meant that the latter could not be included in the model. The analysis restricts itself to those households for which consumptionexpenditure data were available, as this is the income measure used. In the first model (probability of visiting a health-care provider) the analysis is limited to households with data on household expenditure, while the second model restricts itself to households that reported a visit to a healthcare provider during the three-month recall period. The number of observations used for the two models was 296 and 153, respectively. It should be noted that, because only 10 percent of households made informal payments, no variable for informal payments could be included in the analysis. Instead, informal payments are one of the components of the variable ILLCOST, which provides the basis for testing hypothesis 2.
RESULTS
The results of the logit and tobit regressions are shown in Table 4 , which reports the marginal coefficients of the regressors. The first tested model is highly significant overall and the pseudo R 2 value of 0.51 can be considered as fairly good for cross-sectional data. Out of the eleven independent variables included in the model, four have a significant impact on the likelihood of visiting a health-care provider at conventional signifi-cance levels. Notably, income is not one of them, indicating that in fact income does not influence the probability of visiting a health-care provider and that in the rural regions of Russia included in our sample, access to health-care providers is not determined by ability-to-pay. District factors, a Own estimation using LIMDEP *Significant at 0.1 level; **significant at 0.05 level ; ***significant at 0.01 level.
however, do exert considerable influence on access. District expenditure on health care per capita is significant at the 5 percent level, but contrary to expectations the small coefficient has a negative sign. For every additional 100 rubles per capita spent on health care by the district, a person's likelihood of visiting a health-care provider decreases by 1 percent. One explanation for this surprising result is that health status of the population is positively correlated with district health subsidy. Population density has no significant effect on the probability of visiting a health-care provider. At the household level, the number of children (CHILDREN) has a significant positive effect on the probability of visiting a health-care provider. While household size itself has no significant effect, household composition does; for every additional child in a household, the likelihood of visiting a health-care provider increases by 12.4 percent. The individual characteristics of the household head (AGE and EDYEARS) do not appear to play a role. As regards community effects, distance to the nearest hospital exerts a strong influence on the likelihood of visiting a health-care provider (being significant at the 5 percent level). Ceteris paribus, every extra kilometer of distance to a hospital reduces the probability of visiting any healthcare provider by 1 percent. Community size has no influence on the likelihood of use.
Of the fourteen variables included in the second model, four are significant. Most importantly, once again, income is not one of them, indicating that income does not play an important role in determining either access to or demand for health care, and therefore that universal access to health care has indeed been maintained in the study regions. Of the individual household variables, education level of the household head and exemption from prescription charges were significant. Contrary to expectations, education does not have a negative effect on expenditures. Every additional year of education increases expenditures by nearly 11 rubles on average. This may be because the better educated are more aware of the need to invest in health status. EXEMPT is significant at the 10 percent level, and has the expected negative effect. Considering that prescription charges are the largest component of out-of-pocket expenditures, it is by no means surprising that individuals with exemption status face lower out-of-pocket expenditures, by 145 rubles on average.
The level of out-of-pocket expenditure appears to be affected by the choice of health-care provider. Of the seven providers included in the model, only two are not public: private clinics and enterprise clinics. As one might expect, patients treated in private clinics have much higher expenditures than those treated in public clinics. None of the other health care facilities has a significant effect. Interestingly, district education subsidy is not a significant determinant of health expenditures, but population density of the district does have an effect. POPDENS, as expected, is negatively related to expenditures conditional on use, with a one unit increase in population density decreasing expenditures by 3 rubles.
COMPLEMENTARY FINDINGS FROM QUALITATIVE SURVEYS
The estimation results show that income is not yet a significant determinant of the access to health care and does not determine out-of-pocket payments in the rural areas of Russia selected for this study. How can this surprising result be explained? Which factors contribute to making the rural setting different in this regard from urban areas, for which various studies have reported a decline in access to health care by the poor and low-income population?
A follow-up study using qualitative research methods-i.e., group discussions and semi-structured interviews with health sector personnelwas carried out in 2001 in order to find possible explanations for the ruralurban divide. A major argument for the absence of informal payments in local communities, put forward by officials from the various health-care facilities as well as by participants in the group interviews, is that the strength of interdependent relationships in rural communities precludes making access to health services dependent on service charges. The relative isolation of rural communities and their relatively small size mean that villagers are highly dependent on the community and on their social networks in times of need. Strong informal institutions such as social norms and customs promote forms of reciprocity to the extent that health-care workers stressed that they could not introduce informal charges, as this would result in social stigmatization and exclusion from social networks.
The existence of these institutional arrangements has both positive and negative effects. On the one hand it guarantees a minimum of access to health care for all, regardless of income. On the other hand, it crowds out initiatives to modernize and improve the quality of the health-care system because it effectively sanctions the introduction of new forms of risksharing based on the principles of insurance. This leads to a situation in which, for cases of serious illness, people must go to better-equipped hospitals in town, where money matters.
6
It is also noteworthy that our results indicate that access to health care varies among rural districts and communities within a given oblast'. It is likely that these inequalities have become more pronounced in the course of transition because of the establishment of multi-tier government, and because the associated process of decentralization has been incomplete and inconsistent in many respects. Various studies on fiscal federalism in Russia support this view. For instance, Treisman (1997) shows that the rapid process of fiscal decentralization has often been non-transparent; federal grants are distributed according to political negotiations and are not subject to clear economic criteria. Furthermore, Freinkman and Yossifov (1999) show that local governments increased social financing (includ-ing health) while local government's relative share of Russia's consolidated budget has not grown in the years since 1994. Finally, Zhuravskaya (2000) argues that the structure of revenue-sharing between regional and local governments reduces government's incentives to provide public goods efficiently. In general, rayons lack the necessary financial means to provide these services, and their limited funds tend to become concentrated on urban facilities, to the neglect of rural areas (Healey et al., 1999) . This is a profound change from the pre-transition period, when rural areas in transition countries seemed relatively well-off when compared with rural areas in developing countries (Wehrheim and Wiesmann, 2003) . This urban bias that has emerged or at least has become more accentuated in the 1990s is one of the prime reasons why social-service provision in rural areas continues to rely on non-governmental resources. Since 1991, many services have been municipalized, but owing to the limited financing by municipalities, such institutions as health posts, schools, and kindergartens still receive support from rural enterprises, which are often agricultural or forestry enterprises. However, former collective enterprises in rural areas are not alone in acting as sponsors. The qualitative interviews conducted in the rural communities of the two oblasts in 2001 indicate that, in many cases, new businessmen or new local oligarchs provided far more substantial grants to local social-service facilities. In fact, such grants from new businessmen often constitute effective substitutes for the patronage of the former collective farms, many of which today are financially unable to continue making donations to local social-service providers.
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CONCLUSION
This study began with the observation that the transition process has affected the provision of social services in the Russian Federation in general and in rural areas in particular. Following up on this observation, we asked how the reduced role of the state and the concomitant decentralization of policy-making have affected access to health services by the rural populace. A review of the available literature on this topic resulted in the formulation of three hypotheses. These hypotheses were tested on the basis of a household survey conducted in two regions of Russia in 2000. Through econometric analyses, it was concluded that income does not have a significant effect on access to health care in the rural regions of Russia included in the study. The analysis also showed that income does not affect the level of outof-pocket payments incurred upon visiting a health-care provider. This view was confirmed by focus group interviews conducted in the same rural regions, indicating that health care in rural Russia is still a public good and that a "floor" of guaranteed social protection remains in place. However, households still incur considerable costs when using publicly provided health care, especially in cases of hospitalization. Furthermore, we found indications for an urban bias of health-care provision in the study regions: the rural populace encounters difficulties in getting access to higherquality health services, because such care is increasingly limited to urban areas.
A handful of policy suggestions can be extrapolated from the results of this study. Reforms of health-care services in Russia ought to acknowledge the fact that substantial differences in the social-service system exist between urban and rural areas. Based on analytic narratives, there is an indication that informal institutions play a particularly vital role in rural social-service systems. In such a context, the challenge facing policy makers is to create a formal social-insurance system that reaches the rural populace and is compatible with the informal institutions that currently provide social insurance.
8 Hence, it is of utmost importance for Russian policy makers to take into account the legacies of the socialist period that have influenced developments during the transition process. The informal institutions are still part of the system of incentives and constraints that determine how successfully a new market-based social-service system can be introduced in countries with transitional economies. This appears even more important for rural areas, where the legacy of informal institutions is particularly strong.
